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The use of the Internet by consumers has increased dramatically since 1995. In
June of 1995, there were less than 1.5 million users; however, one year later the number
of users had grown to 20 million. The increase in the number of users has contributed to
the growth of business to consumer sales on the Internet. By 1998, approximately 10
million households purchased a product online and the volume of sales was around $66.4
billion. The volume of sales for 1999 has been estimated at $66.4 billion with sales
reaching $177.7 billion by 2003. 1 This phenomenon has propelled the use of electronic
contracts by those who provide computer-generated goods and services to those who wish
to take advantage of the new technology. This expansion of electronic commerce is
compelling changes in contract law.
There are two types of contracts that can be entered into online. The first type
concerns the delivery of products or services outside the computer system, while the
second type relates to subject matter that resides within one or more computer systems.
These agreements, contracted for and performed· online, are created through the use of
electronic agents. Currently, contracts that relate to products deliverable outside the
computer may be covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) while contracts that
are completed totally by computer may not be covered. The major issue is whether
computer contracts should be governed by the UCC or by some other uniform statute. 2
Other important issues that must be addressed include: whether an electronic contract
satisfies the Statute of Frauds; whether the writing can be authenticated; and the validity
of the use of digital signatures.
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In this paper, we will consider: (1) the Statute of Frauds, authentication of the
writing, and the use of digital signatures; (2) applicability of the UCC to electronic
contracts, (3) Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), (4) the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, (5) the potential
impact of the passage of these statutes on electronic contracts, and (6) Shrink-Wrap
and Click Wrap licenses.
*Professor of Law and Program Director for Legal Studies, Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry,
New York. E-mail: djuettner@mercynet.edu
*Professor of Law and Program Chair, Department of Legal Studies & Taxation, Lubin
School of Business, Pace University, Pleasantville, N.Y.10570. Email: rgirasa@pace.edu.
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Contracts Formed on the Internet
Our initial inquiries are: Whether electronic contracts are writings that satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds? Can the writings be authenticated? Can the
alteration of the document by the parties after it is executed be determined and prevented?
What is the validity of the electronic signature to a contract?
Authentication & Electronic Signatures
There are justified concerns that sophisticated users may be able to change onscreen contracts and allege that the altered agreements are the real agreements entered
into by the parties be relied upon. Encryption devices can be used to protect the integrity
of the contents of a document and its signature.
What constitutes a "signature" has been broadly interpreted by many courts to
encompass typed signatures, letterheads, indecipherable scribbling, and pre-printed
signatures. 3 It can be argued that electronic signatures may be more reliable rather than
encompassing an impediment to the fulfillment of the Statute of Frauds. The use of
encryption devices may provide greater security than one's written signature. Such
devices would permit both the sender and receiver of a transmission to possess private
numeric keys known only to them. Thus they would be able to authenticate the
transmission without fear of a third party intrusion.4
Digital signatures permit the verification of the authenticity of a document sent
through the Internet. Digital signatures operate in electronic commerce the way written
signatures operate on typed documents. Neither can disown the signature absence proof
of forgery. Digital signatures require use of two keys, one private and one public. The
keys are issued by a Certification Authority [CA]. The private key is for the sender and
messages are decrypted with the public key. A sender who signs a document with the
private key can have his/her signature confirmed by use of the public key.
A document is initially created as, e.g., a word document, which is sent to digital
signature software to be processed. The processing or coding is done by means of a
sender performing a mathematical computation on his document ("hash function"), which
generates a string of code called a message digest. The message digest is based on the
specific content of the original document so that any changes would give a different
message digest. The algorithm may, e.g., create or count the number of letters or
characters between two specific letters in the document. The hash function or result is
exhibited as a series of numbers.
The sender encrypts the message digest with his private key, which is a password
or number known by the sender only, attaches his signature to the end of the documents
thereby signing it by means of a second algorithm, and sends it to the receiver. The
receiver having access to the public key may now verify the sender's identity and
integrity of the document. The signature is decrypted with the sender' s public key and the
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allow non-fmancial institutions to use electronic authentication services and should allow
use of electronic signatures online.
The validity of electronic signatures, as set forth in § 101 of the statute states:
(a) GENERAL RULE- With respect to any contract, agreement, or record
entered into or provided in, or affecting, ·interstate or foreign
commerce, notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of
law, the legal effect, validity, or enforceability or such contract,
agreement, or record shall not be denied( 1) on the ground that the contract, agreement, or record is not in
writing if the contract, agreement, or record is an electronic
record; or
(2) on the ground that the contract, agreement, or record is not
signed or is not affrrmed by a signature if the contract,
agreement, or record is signed or affirmed by an electronic
signature.
The statute does not require the parties to use electronic means for agreements nor
does it deny them the right to choose the type or method of electronic record or signature
to utilize (§101(b)). If a state statute requires a record be provided in writing to a
consumer, an electronic record would suffice provided the consumer has consented to
such methodology by means of a "conspicuous and visually separate" consent, has been
informed of the hardware and software requirements for access and retention of electronic
records, and has been otherwise advised of the obligation to provide notifications be
electronic means(§ 101(b)(2)).
A state statute requiring that a contract, agreement, or record be retained will be
met by an electronic record provided it is an accurate reflection of the information set
forth in the written agreement and is accessible for the time required by state law.
Requirements for the maintenance of originals, including checks, will suffice if the
electronic record contains all of the relevant information (§101(2)(c)).
Of particular importance to our discussion is §102 of the Act concerning the right
of a state to modify or supercede the within statute. The Act does permit a state to do so if
the state statute, regulation, or rule of law:
(l)(A) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act as reported to the State legislatures by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; or
(B) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements for the use
or acceptance (or both) of electronic records or electronic signatures to
establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts,
agreements or records; and
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(3) if enacted or adopted after the date of the enactment of this Act
makes specific reference to this Act.
'
The state
i_f any, may
discriminate in favor of or against a specific
for authentication of electroruc records or specifies a specific type or size of
entity engaged in business or is otherwise inconsistent with the Act.
Article 2B of the UCC and UCITA ("Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act")
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL)
worked for about ten years to revise Article 2 of the UCC to cover electronic contracts.
In
of 1988, the
Editorial Board of the UCC and the (NCCUSL)
appomted a study group to Identify the problems that electronic exchanges were creating
and
recommend possible revisions to the UCC. In December of 1991, a drafting
was created by the NCCUSL to revise Article 2(Sales) to preserve freedom of
m
contracts. In order to achieve this task, the
Draftmg Comtn1ttee
considered
vanous
alternatives to address the scope of electronic
contracts. 10 Three of the alternatives are:

(1 ) Defming the scope of Article 2 to include software license contracts in Article
2, making adjustments
Article 2 s7ctions to encompass the intangibles
of
transactwn, and adopting new sections in the 800 and 900
senes to deal Wlth applicable licensing issues.
(2) Adopting an "hub and spoke" configuration for Article 2 in which Article 2
contains general principles applicable to all commercial contracts and have
these apply to various sub-articles dealing with specific types of transactions
as 2A (leases), Article B (sales), Article 2C (licenses).
(3) Taking software contracts out of Article 2 and develop a new article of the
UCC:
Article 2B Licensing of Intangibles. 11

In
of_l995, the Executive Committee of the NCCUSL decided that the best
to
Article 2
to
a
article to address the issues involving digital
info_rmatwn and
n ghts m mtangible property. Accordingly, the American Law
Institute and the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared
a
of an Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, called "Software Contracts
12
and Licenses of Information. " The groups spent many years working to develop Article
2B.
. About ten years ago, a Subcommittee of the American Bar Association began
whether there
a n7ed for a statute that would address the licensing
transactwns. of computer information. The Subcommittee concluded that three was a
need to clanfy these transactions and recommend to the NCCUSL that a uniform act be
drafted. The NCCUSL agreed and appointed a Drafting Committee in the early 1990's.
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Firstly, the UCITA Committee was merged into the UCC Drafting Committee for Article
2. In 1995, the UCITA Committee was removed as a separate drafting committee and in
13
1998 began drafting a separate uniform act.
On April 7, 1999, the ALI and the NCCUSL
that they would not
recommend amending the UCC with Article 2B but were recommending the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for adoption by the states. They
reached this conclusion because the Internet and Information Technology does not
14
presently allow the kind of codification that is represented by the UCC. The first state to
adopt UCITA was Virginia.
The Uniform Computer lnformationTransactions Act
UCITA applies to contracts to license or buy software, create computer programs
online, access to databases and contracts to distribute information over the Internet.
Proponents ofUCITA assert that the statute:
•
•
•

Provides for freedom to contract,
Supports commercial expansion
Permits federal intellectual property law to co-exist with state contrr.ct

•

law, and
Permits the parties to opt in or out of the statute.'s

Statutory Definitions

Mixed Contractual Transactions and UCITA
A
govern the entire contract if the primary purpose of the contract is
informatlon. When UCITA is not the primary purpose of the contract, UCITA
Will govern only the computer information portion of the agreement. UCITA does not
apply to Articles 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Article 9
governs if there are conflicts between the two statutes.
Some UCITA Provisions
l!CITA
the formation of electronic contracts by electronic agents if they
engage m operattons that confirm a contract. It can also be formulated if an individual
takes an action and has reason to know that the ' action will cause the electronic agent to
perform.
UCITA does provide(s) the following remedies for licensors of Shrink-wrapped
software agreements if the licensee doesn't have the chance to read all the terms of the
shrink-wrapped license contract before paying:
1. a full refund,
2. reimbursement of reasonable expenses related to return, and/or
3. payment for foreseeable losses caused by installation of the information.
The warranties provided under UCITA are similar to Article 2 as well as
that .are
with certain limitations. They reflect typical computer
informatton constderattons such as infringement, integration, etc.

A computer information transaction is "an agreement and the performance of that
agreement to create, modify, transfer or license computer information or informational
rights in computer information."

16

Computer information is "information in electronic form that is obtained from or
through the use of a computer or that is in digital or similar form capable of being
processed by a computer." This term also includes an electronic copy of the information
together with any documentation or packaging related to the copy.
Items Not Covered by UCITA
UCITA excludes the following:
1. Financial services transactions which are addressed by the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act(UETA)
2. Contracts related to television, music and motion picture industry
3. Compulsory licenses
4. Employment contracts
5. De minimus transactions.
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UCITA Remedies
The general rule is to give the aggrieved party the benefit of the contract if there is
a breach; however, the aggrieved party must take reasonable measures to mitigate his/her
damages. The most controversial of the remedies is electronic self-help.
Pros and Cons ofUCITA
.

UCITA is supported by the large computer related corporations such as:
America Online and the Federal Reserve. Opponents of UCITA
educational institutions, consumer advocates, attorneys general,
hbrary associatiOns, and msurance companies.
Satisfying The Writing Requirement of the UCC
One benefit that
derived from the Article 2B proposals and incorporated into
UCITA was the change m the definition of a writing to include the maintenance of an
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electronic record.'' It gives legal recognition to electronic records as writings as well as
_to address
issues created when the
digital and electronic signatures. This change
Statute of Frauds is invoked by a party to an act10n man electroruc contract case.
Historically, oral contracts were enforceable under English law until 1677 when
18
the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries was enacted by the British Parliament. In essence,
the Statute provided that certain agreements had to be in writing, to wit:
. .
( 1) promise to answer for the debt of another;
(2) agreement that by their tenor cannot be performed Within one year from the
making thereof;
(3) agreements made in consideration of marriage;
(4) agreements concerning the sale of realty;
( S) promise by an executor or administrator of a decedent's estate to pay estate
indebtedness from his/her personal funds;
(6) sale of goods whose price is $500 or more; and
(7) miscellaneous other agreements as provided by state law.
The difficulty presented by the Statute of Frauds is that a writing is required
all of the above contracts thus rendering agreements not in accordance thereWith
unenforceable. The writing must include the signature signed by the party to be charged.
Does a digital signature conform to the Statute of Frauds? Without statutory amendments,
digital signatures may not qualify. The Statute of Frauds says that the
promise, or undertaking must be "subscribed by the party to be charged thereWith, or by
19
his lawful agent ... "
The Statute of Frauds requires a signature but the term "signature: is broadly
to
the
reasonably
interpreted. The test is whether the person
believed that the other party intended to authenticate the wntlng. Thus, Initials or other
symbols may be sufficient. The sign or symbol can be anywhere on the
not
necessarily at the end thereto. The signature may be typed, stamped, or pnnted. The
UCC 1-201 (39) states that "signed" includes "any symbol, executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing."
In the absence of a broad interpretation by the courts as to admission of electronic
terms and signatures under the Statute of Frauds, it would appear that
to
Enghs_h law
existing statutory requirements would be necessary. The U.S. could
reqUired .a
which abolished the Statute of Frauds for most contracts that
writing or the Statute can be amended to permit a statutory exception for electroruc
contracts. A modification of the Statute's requirements was instituted by the _enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-201 which contains the requrrement
a
writing for the purchase or sale of goods $500 or more also has a number of exceptions
21
• th
.
not applicable to the Statute s o er sections.
It appears from the exceptions created by the enactment of the UCC
centuries later that scholars are uneasy about rendering unenforceable contracts lacking
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the requirements of a writing. Historically, prior to the 1677 Statute writings were
unnecessary because most inhabitants were illiterate. With the post-World War II
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the addition of several major exceptions to
the requirement of a writing indicated a desire by the drafters to be more in accord with
the realities of the marketplace. The new realities of cyberspace and the multitude of
contracts of purchase and sales now taking place illustrate the need to create a new
regime for Internet contracts. One may seriously question whether the Statute protects
against fraud or permits fraud by allowing a person wishing to avoid a contract to raise
the lack of writing defense. 22
Another advantage of the provisions set forth in_the suggested Article 2B may be
found in a number of proposed sections thereto. For example, Section 2B-203A(a) would
mimic Section 2-207(1) of the UCC Sales Article by permitting acceptance of an offer for
Internet services "even if the acceptance contains terms that vary from the terms of the
offer, unless the acceptance materially conflicts with material term of the offer or
materially varies from the terms of the offer.'>n Section 2B-204 discusses the rules for
automated transactions. It explicitly permits the formation of a contract if the interaction
by the electronic agents "results in the electronic agents' engaging in operations that
confirm or indicate the existence of a contract unless the operations resulted from
electronic mistake, fraud and the like."
A contract may be formed in any manner showing agreement including by offer
and acceptance, conduct of the parties, and/or operations of electronic agents recognizing
the existence of a contract. Such agreement may be established even in the absence of the
determination of when the agreement was entered into, or if one or more terms are left
open but such terms can be reasonably ascertained. If there is a material disagreement in
the absence of contrary conduct, then the contract is not formed. 14 Assent is manifested to
a record or term in electronic contracts by authenticating the record or term, by conduct
or statements indicating assent, or circumstances show assent by an electronic agent.15
Shrinkwrap license agreements [discussed below] are enforceable under Section 2B208(a) unless they are unconscionable or other unenforceable. 16
Damages in electronic contracts to a licensor by a licensee would include sums
not to exceed the contract fee and the market value of other consideration required for
performance under the contract. They include accrued and unpaid contract fees, the
market value of other consideration earned but not received, consequential and incidental
damages, and "damages calculated in any reasonable manner.'.,,
Does the Legal Reasoning Applicable to Click Wrap/Shrink-Wrap Licenses
Control in Electronic Contracts?
Is the act of entering a credit card number and clicking acceptance of purchase
sufficient to make a purchaser liable under terms and conditions set out on the screen in
an unreadable form or which are declared after the purchase ? Perhaps the legal
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reasoning that was promulgated in deciding shrink-wrap license cases will provide a
possible direction for electronic cases.
An on-going issue in which courts have decided in opposition to each
is the
le ality of shrink-wrap licenses. We are all familiar with the packages ensconced m clear
pl!stic cellophane wrappers containing the familiar notice:
Before you open this package: Carefully read the following
legal agreement regarding your use of the enclosed
By the act of opening the sealed package, usmg the
software or permitting its use, you will indicate your full
consent to the terms and conditions of this agreement. If
you don't agree with what it says, you
return the
software package within 7 days of your rece1pt for a full
refund.
the
Such
Thereafter, a highly extensive, small print restrictive notice
notice constitutes what is euphemistically is called a shrink-wrap hcense or
agreement.28 It is on most software packages. The difficulty is that most
purchase the product often unaware of the restrictions being imposed upon them until
they have unwrapped the package. The notice is often repeated on screen when the user
inserts the CD-ROM unto the hard drive. How legal is it to compel
and users
of goods containing such notices to comply with the post-purchase restnctions.
At first blush such notices may be superfluous inasmuch as software pr?grams are
protected by the copyright laws that restrict
and/or
distribution of the programs. The leading cases discussmg the
are. IJ9CD.
Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Servrces, I3
and
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology and the Software Link, Inc.

0.

In PROCD the plaintiff compiled a computer database containing some 3,000
telephone directorles. The database is sold under the trademark label
users on CD-ROM discs. The license agreement is seen as soon as the packagmg 1s
unwrapped. A copyrighted application program permits the user to search the database for
the telephone number of the person named by the user. The plaintiff spent some $10
million to compile and keep current the database. The database costs about 1SO to
purchasers thereof. The resale or other dissemination of the product was thus
the licensing agreement when the package was opened as well as set forth on liDtlal
application of the software.
The defendant, Zeidenberg, bought the software and decided to ignore
restrictive notice by reselling the information under his corporation,
Web Services, Inc. The price charged was less than that charged by the plamtiff. _'Nhen
the plaintiff sued for an injunction and other relief, the lower court
that the hcense
was not enforceable because the terms were not outside of the packagmg.
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The Court of Appeals reversed. Defendant's claim was that the package on the
store's shelf was an offer that a person accepts by buying the product. It noted that the
length of the license and other terms would preclude their exhibition on the box cover
unless they were printed microscopically. A notice on the outside of the box that the sale
is subject to a license with terms detailed on the inside with a right to return the purchase
sufficed to protect the licensor. Purchases of goods before communication of detailed
terms is made are common. For example, insurance purchases are made without a reading
of the policy that follows after the purchase. Ditto for purchases of airline tickets. Tickets
for shows have restrictions either on the rear of the ticket and/or at the theatre as to
recording and use of cameras. Drugs and appliances have detailed warnings and other
information within the box that is not opened until after the purchase.
The Court then addressed whether UCC section 2-201 precluded the holding
herein. The lower Court felt that inasmuch as a new UCC section 2-2203 has been
proposed to validate shrink-wrap licenses, then the existing section would not so validate.
The Court stated that those changes in wording did not necessarily change the meaning of
the prior statute but may have fortified or clarified the statute. The Court distinguished
three other shrink-wrap cases31 by stating that the issues therein concerned battle-of-theforms and not the main issue in the within action.
The appropriate section according to the Court is UCC 2-204(1) which states that
"A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract."
Thus, a vendor may invite acceptance by conduct and can interpose limitations on what
constitutes acceptance. The UCC explicitly allows contracts to be formed in other ways.
Such is the case at hmd. The defendant was displayed the license agreement on opening
the package md on viewing the screen.
Moreover, UCC section 2-206 governing acceptance further reinforces the
plaintiff's position. It states that a buyer accepts goods by failing to make an effective
rejection after having had an opportunity to inspect them. The defendant inspected the
package, used the software, saw the license, and failed to reject the goods.
The Court disposed of the alleged contradictory holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.32 that held a sirlgle
alphabetical telephone directory was not original and therefore was not entitled to
copyright protection. 33 In the within case, the defendant was precluded by contract if not
by the Copyright Law to duplicate the information contained in the CD ROM.
In the Step-Saver action, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to a
different conclusion. In. 1981, Step-Saver developed a program combining hardware and
software to satisfy word processing and other purposes for use by physicians md
attorneys based on the IBM personal computer system. It selected a program by the
defendant TSL as the operating system and terminals manufactilred by Wyse to
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accomplish its purposes. After having done so, the Company received many complaints
from customers and sued Wyse and TSL seeking indemnity with respect to lawsuits
instituted against it by customers. The plaintiff, Step-Saver alleged breach of warranties
by Wyse and TSL. The trial court dismissed as against TSL holding that the box-top
license disclaimed all express and implied warranties.
The box-top licenses stated that the customer did not purchase the software but
only a personal, non-transferable license to use the [program; that all expressed and
implied warranties were disclaimed; that the sole remedy was to return the defective disk
for replacement and that all damages were disclaimed; that the license was the final and
complete expression of the parties' agreement' and that opening the package indicated an
acceptance of the above terms and conditions. If the user did not agree, the purchase
could be returned within fifteen days of purchase and all monies would be returned.
With respect to the effect of the box-top license that the plaintiff alleged did not
become a part of the contract because it was a material alteration and that the license was
not intended to be a final and complete expression of the terms of the agreement, the
Court of Appeals stated that UCC section 2-207 was applicable. The section provides:
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent
to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer,
(b) they materially alter it, or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a
contract for sale although the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such a case
the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provision of the Act."
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The Court stated that Section 2-207 attempts to distinguish between standard
terms in a form confirmation that a party wishes the Court to incorporate in the event of a
dispute and the actual terms understood by the parties as governing the agreement. The
burden is upon the party asking the court to enforce its form to determine that a particular
clause was a part of the contract. In applying this test, the Court said that the consent by
opening provision did not make Step-Saver's acceptance conditional. When a person has
gone through the effort of making a purchase, "the purchaser has made a decision to buy
a particular product and has actually obtained the product, the purchaser may use it
despite the refund offer, regardless of the additional terms specified after the contract
formed [at p. 34)." There was no evidence to show that TSL would have refused to sell if
Step-Saver had not consented to the restrictive terms. The Court thus held that the boxtop license did not contain the complete and final expression of the terms of the parties'
agreement.
The difference in the two decisions may lie in the refusal of both courts to become
parties to actions by defendants to evade responsibility for errant actions. In the ProCD
case, the defendant converted the effort of the plaintiff in amassing data requiring the
expenditure of millions of dollars and significant time to integrate telephone listing from
many hundreds of sources. In the Step-Saver case, the defendant sought to prevent
liability accruing to it for defective performances as to leave the plaintiff in the position
of being responsible for its unsatisfactory performance. It would appear, however, that
shrink-wrap licenses will be enforceable provided they are not unreasonable, particularly
in consumer transactions.
Click-Wrap Agreements
Click-wrap agreements are similar to shrink-wrap licenses. The user generally
opens a new program being installed on a computer or where the program was initially
installed on a new computer and is faced with an agreement to which the user is given the
choice of agreeing or not agreeing with the contents. The program will not open unless
consent by clicking on the box containing the words "I agree" or similar wording to the
terms on the agreement is given. The question again is whether such agreements are valid
and enforceable against the user.
In Crispi v. Microsoft Network. L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118 (N.J. App. Div.,
1999), the New Jersey Appellate Court upheld the trial court's determination that such
consent by a user becomes a binding contract. The Court also upheld the forum selection
clause contained in the agreement that compels all lawsuits arising out of the contract to
take place in Kings County, in the State of Washington. Thus, the result of the case is that
a person purchasing and using Microsoft programs may have to travel to the State of
Washington to sue or defend a lawsuit for an alleged breach of the agreement consented
to which agreement becomes known only after one opens the program.
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A similar result took place in Geoffv. A.O.L., File No. C.A. No. PC 97-0331,
1998 (R.I. Sup. Ct., 1998), wherein the Court upheld an agreement that a subscriber to
America Online's Internet service had to consent to before the service could be accessed.
The Court said that a person who signs an agreement by clicking onto the "I agree"
button cannot later complain that the agreement was not read or understood.

intellectual property rights, cybercrime and the like. Similar developments in cybercontracts
are now taking shape. We have discussed a few of the issues being addressed at this time.
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connected to a business, commercial and governmental affairs. It is broader that Article
2B and USCITA inasmuch as it is not limited to licensing agreements and covers the
transactions in Article 2 of the UCC. By adopting the UETA, states need not be
concerned with an expansive definition of a writing nor need it adopt the controversial
Article 2B. Thus, it appears that states have a variety of choices in the legislative scheme
they wish to adopt. The clear mandate is that an electronic record may no longer be
denied legal effect.
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Szafran, Marc E., ''Note: A Nco-Institutional Paradigm for Contracts Formed in Cyberspace: Judgment
Day for the Statute of Frauds, 14 Cardozo Ars and Ent. L.J. 491.498 (1996) .

84

85

11
See Nimmer, Raymond et al. "License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code· A
Proposal," 19 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 281, 283 (1993).
.
12
• F?r a lengthy examination of Article 2B, see Jody Storm Gale, ''NOTE: Service Over the ''Net":
Princtples of Contract Law in Conflict," 49 Case W. Res. 567 (Spring, 1999).

13

Dively, Mary Jo Howard & Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. "Overview of Unifonn Computer Information
Transactions Act, p.3. Paper written by the Advisor to Drafting Committee and Chair ofUCITA Drafting
Committee respectively. http://www .law .upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucitalhtm

2
•

Section 2B-202.

25

Section 2B-lll(a).

1
•

26

Press Release of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, April 7, 1999,
Chicago, Illinois.
u Dively, Mary Jo Howard. Overview of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. Paper
presented at the Conference on Electronic Commerce: Exploring the Legal and Business Interface at
Georgetown University School of Law, Washington, D.C., December 8-10,1999.

Section 2B-208{a) provides: "A party adopts the tenus of a mass-market license for purposes of Section
2B-207 only if the party agrees to the license, by manifesting assent or otherwise, before or during the
party's initial performance or use of or access to the information." Section 2B-207 states that a party adopts
the proposed license agreement by assenting to it initially or even later if the party knew the whole of it
would be presented at a subsequent time.
27

16

Section 2B-708-2B-709.

UCITA, Section 102(12)
21

17

For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see David A. Einhorn, "Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The Debate
Continues," IDEA: The Journal ofLaw and Technology, 38 IDEA 383-401.

Article 2B-102(37). See also 2B-207.

11

For a discussion of the Statute of Frauds, see any standard basic business law text such as Ronald A.
Anderson, Ivan Fox, David B. Twomey, and Marianne M. Jennings, Business Law and the Legal
Environment, {171h ed., (West Publishing Company: 1999), pp. 300-304. The Statute of Frauds in New
York can be found in General Obligations Law, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated.
Book 23 A, section 5-701. See, also, the Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-201 for the sale of goods
provision of the Statute of Frauds.
19

See McKinney's, ill, 5-70l{a).

_F. 2d _ (U.S.C.A.

30

939 F. 2d 91 (U.S.C.A. 3d, 1991).

31

Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F. 2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F. 2d 255, 268-70 {5111 Cir. 1988).;and Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link.
Inc.; 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
32

20

See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, 2d ed. (Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 434-435, citing
Southwest Engr. Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 473 P. 2d 1276 (4th Cir.) where the seller's
trademark on sales brochures was a signature. In Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cole, 189
Conn. 518, 547 A. 2d 656 (1983), a letterhead or billhead was sufficient for statutory requirements under
ucc 2-210.

rn Cir., 1996).

29

499 u.s. 340 (1991).

33

Section 30l{a) preempts any "legal or equitable rights ... that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified in section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified in sections 102
and 103."

21

Section 2-201 provides: "(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the contract is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the
requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received. (3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)
[requirement of a writing for sale of goods of $500 or more] but which is valid in
respects is
enforceable (a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received
and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a
substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or {b) if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale
was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted;
or 0 with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which has been received and
accepted... "
22 For an in depth discussion of the Statute of Frauds and its applicability in today's world, see Shawn
Pompian, Note: Is the Statute of Frauds Ready for Electronic Contracting?, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1447 (Oct.
1999).
23
Like Article 2, as between parties either or both of whom are not merchants, then the terms of the
original offer hold, nonmaterial added terms are treated as proposals for added terms and, as between
merchants, the proposed added terms become part of the contract unless the offeror gives notice of
objection before or with in a reasonable time after notice of the said added terms.

86

87

